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Abstract 
In recent years, great numbers of enterprises worldwide form International Strategic Alliances (ISAs) in order to expand 
internationally and gain global competitiveness. The objective of this paper is to present a number of propositions on the 
contextual factors that have an impact on the development of trust at the later stages of ISA operations. We propose that alliance 
age and interdependence will positively affect the development of trust among alliance partners. On the contrary, we expect that 
perceived risk of opportunism will have a negative impact on trust development among alliance partners.  
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1. Introduction 
 
International strategic alliances (ISAs) have become an increasingly salient part of the contemporary global 
environment (Kumar and Andersen, 2000). However ISAs remain unstable forms of collaborative agreements. As 
Kauser and Shaw (2004) note, 30% – 70% of them fail. Similarly, Lumma and Haugen, (2008) report failure ISA 
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(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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rates higher than 50%. The above, according to Kale and Sing (2009), create a “paradox” for firms. While firms are 
seeking to enter international collaborative agreements, and their numbers have grown, they are facing many 
challenges and difficulties with their operation, resulting to high failure rates. 
The reasons that lead to ISAs termination have been analyzed extensively in the past (partner conflict, 
dissatisfaction, opportunistic behaviour, communication etc). However, as As Li and Gao (2008) note, despite the 
increased interest and research on ISAs, there is a gap (both academic and managerial) on the various aspects of 
inter-firm collaborations. As a result, it is not surprising that managers and academics still have no concrete 
perception of the factors that make ISAs successful (Kauser and Shaw, 2004). We consider trust to be one of the 
most important success factors for international collaborations (Rotsios et al., 2014). The importance of trust further 
increases when there is a negative “country of origin” effect (Li et al., 2007). This effect is prominent in the South 
Eastern Europe context in which our research is mainly focused. However, since it not feasible to explore all factors 
related to trust among ISA partners, we focus on some that have emerged from the literature as being very important, 
namely age, interdependence and perceived risk of opportunism among alliance partners. The purpose of this paper 
is to revisit the concept of trust in the context of ISAs and to present a number of propositions on the contextual 
factors that affect the development of trust at the later stages of ISA operations. These propositions will be tested 
empirically in the near future.  
2. Post alliance formation factors 
Many empirical studies measuring trust predict it to increase with the duration of a relationship (Anderson and 
Weitz, 1989; Chua et al., 2008; Doney and Cannon, 1997; Ganesan, 1994; Wang et al., 2010). Since firms involved 
in ISAs develop close bonds over time and, if the ISA is successful, form positive attitudes regarding each other’s 
reliability, the level of trust is likely to improve over time. In terms of performance, as empirically shown by Meschi 
(1997), one would expect that “all cultural differences in an ISA, regardless of their nature and intensity, will 
ultimately recede over time”. Although intuitively appealing, in reality there will always be cultural and 
organizational distance in dyadic relationships – particularly relationships spanning national boundaries. However, 
some studies suggest a positive correlation between on one hand duration and trust and on the other trust and 
learning in relation to ISAs (Norman, 2000). Trust is to a certain degree a trial–and–error process, and in the absence 
of prior experience with the partner, time serves as a mechanism for embeddedness and trust development. 
On the other hand, Li et al. (2006), in their study of trust building of local senior managers in 138 International 
Joint Ventures (IJVs) operating in China, controlled for firm age because sociologists suggest that trust evolves over 
time (Gulati, 1995). Firm age was measured as the number of years since the IJV first set up in China. The results 
indicated that firm age is not significantly related to trust. Thus, the logic proposed by the social perspective -‘‘trust 
develops over time’’- does not seem to apply in this research context (Li et al., 2006). It may be that, in a highly 
unfamiliar and uncertain environment, a longer history leads to both trust and distrust (Child and Mollering, 2003). 
According to Child and Mollering (2003), active trust development, by its very nature, requires time to be realized. 
While it is possible that relationships between foreign managers and local staff may deteriorate over a period of time 
with a resulting decline in trust and that it may take time to recognize untrustworthiness, this does not detract from 
the point that the development of trust itself requires time, especially when it cannot draw on generalized 
institutions, but only on individual investments. The results of Child and Mollering’s (2003) research revealed that 
the length of time in the Chinese environment marginally does predict higher trust in local staff and it primarily 
leveraged the effect of personal rapport on trust. The results of Child and Mollering’s (2003) research suggest that 
active trust development policies take time to provide a basis for increasing trust. 
Different studies report a positive regression coefficient between trust and duration (Anderson and Weitz, 1989), 
a negative one (Poppo et al., 2008), or no relation (Doney and Cannon, 1997). Vanneste et al. (2014), through a 
meta-analysis of 39 studies, find that the bivariate correlation between trust and relationship duration is on average, 
positive and small and varies significantly across studies indicating the presences of unobserved moderators. 
Therefore, they construct a theoretical framework to specify four different mechanisms (initial bias correction, 
change in relationship value, identification and trust-based selection) that may affect the development of trust and 
argue that the relative strength of these potentially countervailing mechanisms should influence whether trust 
increases, remains constant, or decreases over time. 
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Lewicki and Wiethoff (2000) examine identification – based trust, where parties come to know and understand 
the expectations of one another. In time, they develop the ability to know what one another would want in a given 
situation and take the initiative of acting for each other in certain situations. Often, these individuals share common 
values, they have an outlook based on mutual benefit, and over time are able to develop a collective identity. It is as 
though both parties have learned a dance, and are able to lead and follow as necessary, trusting one another along the 
way. If this type of relationship can develop in the workplace, it will be much easier for parties to work together as a 
team, understanding the expectations, goals, and needs of one another. Lewicki and Wiethoff (2000) point out that, 
in order to build identification – based trust, it is important for persons to set aside time to get to know one another, 
thereby discovering common interests, personal values, perceptions, motivation, objectives and goals. They may 
even discover that they react similarly in certain situations. A strong emotion component is present in, and will help 
to establish a secure base from which to build (Lewicki and Wiethoff, 2000). Madhok (1995) notes that sustained 
interaction is a crucial mechanism for holding partners together. Similarly, Kollock (1994) found a strong 
relationship between commitment and trust. Hence, through repeated interaction and information exchange, partners 
should identify and develop more commonalities, which in turn would reinforce a sense of trust. One can argue that 
it is the longevity of an ISA that depends on trust and without its presence an ISA cannot withstand through time. 
We argue that, apart from trust, longevity of an ISA depends on a number of factors such as unpredictable changes 
in economic environment, resource interdependence among partners and imponderable factors of social nature in the 
host country. Therefore, we consider trust as the dependent variable in this case. Thus, one would expect alliance age 
to have a positive impact on trust development:  
 
Proposition 1: Alliance age will have a positive impact on the development of trust among ISA partners 
 
Apart from that, another crucial factor that facilitates the expansion of trust at the later stages of ISAs is 
interdependence of the partner firms that builds up through time. Interdependence is used in the management 
literature to suggest the presence of mutual dependencies between two parties (Calton and Lad, 1995; Oliver, 1990). 
According to Sambasivan et al. (2011:554), interdependence refers to the belief that “the outcomes of a relationship 
depend heavily on both the individual and the joint actions that people in a dyad undertake”. In ISAs, partners are 
expected to contribute resources; as a consequence there is always a level of interdependence among them. Previous 
work has shown that in most cases foreign partners enter ISA agreements in order to gain access to knowledge on 
local market conditions, whereas local partners seek to obtain access to technology and capital (Hsieh et al., 2010).   
Overall there is an agreement among researchers that balanced relationships are crucial for ISA success. It is 
expected that higher levels of interdependence lead to higher commitment levels among ISA partners. A high level 
of interdependence is expected to occur when firms perceive the resources their partners contributed to be critical for 
the alliance success (Das and Rumar, 2009). Furthermore, interdependence facilitates understanding and partners are 
more willing to work closely, to exchange information and to trust each other, since they believe that greater benefits 
will come from collaborative than individual work (Sambasivan et al., 2011). Li and Gao (2008) argue that a 
balanced relationship among ISA partners will contribute to the stability of the ISA. However, when there is no 
balance, chances are that instability will prevail, since the more powerful partner might demonstrate opportunistic 
behavior (Hsieh et al., 2010). Thorgen et al. (2010), in their research on SMEs in strategic networks, have found a 
positive relationship between relational capital, knowledge transfer and interdependence. Many researchers agree 
that higher levels of dependency among alliance partners lead to mutual trust (De Jong and Woolthuis, 2008; 
Krishnan et al., 2006). 
Trust is closely related to interdependence in ISAs, since the interest (in relation to the ISA) of one partner cannot 
be achieved without reliance upon the other partner. Moreover, Powell (1996) examines strategic alliances and 
concludes that trust emerges from mutual dependencies. According to Gao et al. (2002), high and mutual 
dependence relationships usually involve extensive personal interaction, information exchange, and resource 
integration. The opportunities for intensive interactions in a balanced dependence relationship provide a field where 
mutual trust can emerge and develop. 
An important view in alliance theory is that resource interdependence glues two partners in long – range 
cooperation, conflict resolution and forbearance maintenance (Buckley and Casson, 1988; Doz, 1996; Hamel, 1991; 
Parkhe, 1993). The stronger the resource interdependence between parties, the more opportunities and benefits will 
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be created from cooperation and trust (Ring and Van de Ven, 1994; Yan and Gray, 1994). This corroborates a tenet 
in trust literature arguing that the influence of trust on performance is increasingly a function of interparty reliance 
(Rousseau et al., 1998). Buckley and Casson (1988) note that trust can be transmitted much more smoothly to a 
higher level of cooperation, if resource interdependence between parties is higher. Based on several cross – cultural 
case studies, Yan and Gray (1994) observed an increasing role of trust in weakening the hazardous effect of self – 
interest bargaining on ISA performance in situations where both parties are more reliant on each other's distinctive 
resources (Luo, 2002). 
According to Wicks and Berman (2004: 144), ‘‘as interdependence goes up, so does the need for (and value of) 
trust within the relationship’’. Interdependence creates an incentive structure that deters exploitation, which in turn 
lowers the transaction cost of exchange as business partners exchange valuable, irreplaceable resources. According 
to Katsikeas et al. (2009: 147), “significant economic benefits could result for a firm from placing emphasis on trust 
with foreign partners that share and/or have the prospects of greater interdependence, whereas engaging in trusting 
relations is uneconomical when the value received and irreplaceability between the partners are low”. 
Interdependence favours ISA stability and provides a motivation to act in a trustworthy manner or promote a desire 
to resolve any conflicts (Huang et al., 2012). Wicks and Berman (2004) emphasize the important idea that trust is a 
costly governance mechanism, to be deployed only when necessary. They suggest that the greater the degree of 
interdependence between the parties to the exchange, the greater will be the need for trust.  
Contrary to the above, Ibara and Turk (2009), in their research on technology alliances, found no evidence on the 
positive relationship between interdependence and trust between alliance partners. Similarly, Kauser and Shaw 
(2004) found only partial support on the argument that partners in successful ISAs are more interdependent than in 
alliances with weaker ties among partners. 
Zaheer and Zaheer (2006) present a model that argues for viewing trust symmetry and asymmetry between 
partners, together with their degree of interdependence in international collaborations, to arrive at a set of 
mechanisms and implications for investment in trust – building and governance. Similarly, as argued by resource 
dependence theorists (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978), firms depend on access to (external) resources critical to firm 
performance and competitive advantage. Hence, interdependence provides not only a useful connection to trust, but 
it underlines trust as an effective mechanism to gain access to and utilize external knowledge in order to improve 
performance. As mentioned above, one can argue that there is a two way link between trust and interdependence and 
can wonder which variable depends on another. We agree that a two way link between the variables is valid indeed, 
but our purpose is to examine the factors that contribute to the development of trust in ISAs and all the above 
reasoning leads to the consideration of trust as the dependent variable in this case. Thus, the following relationship 
between interdependence and trust can be derived:  
 
Proposition 2: Interdependence will have a positive impact on the development of trust among ISA partners  
  
Moreover, we suggest that the risk of opportunistic behaviour plays a dominant role for the continuity of trust 
development in an ISA. We attempt to ascertain the link between trust and perceived risk of opportunism from the 
other ISA partners rather than effective opportunism which has an obvious negative relationship with trust. It is true 
that perceived risk of opportunism may also impede alliance formation, but we agree with Nielsen (2001), who 
supports that the risk of opportunistic behaviour plays a more important role during the later stages of an ISA, when 
structural and contractual elements are repeatedly evaluated. An important limitation in current work within social 
exchange theory is the neglect of deceit and opportunism in exchange relations. That is, in the typical exchange 
experiment actors bargain over the price of their goods, but there is never the possibility of lying about the value of 
the good, receiving a good without paying the agreed price, or backing out of a contract after it has been agreed upon 
(Kollock, 1994). The concept of opportunistic behaviour emanates from the transaction cost literature and is defined 
as “self-interest seeking with guile” (Williamson, 1975), which increases transaction costs and encourages formal 
governance structures. As such, it restrains collaborative arrangements for which trust is considered a key factor. 
However, empirical research indicates that “human behaviour may not be so Machiavellian after all”, particularly in 
long – term relationships (John, 1984). Hence, incorporating trust in models of interfirm relationships provides a 
unique vantage point for treating opportunism as an explanatory variable (Dwyer et al., 1987). 
For Six (2004) the process of building trust requires the suspension of opportunistic behaviour, so that the 
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absence of opportunistic behaviour is a crucial condition for the trustor to place trust in the trustee. Vertical 
integration, hostages and offsetting investments are well – established safeguards against opportunistic behaviour 
when specific assets are involved. However, despite Kogut and Singh’s (1988) observation that ISAs can be 
regarded a response to the existence of asset specificity, collaboration does not constitute a foolproof safeguard 
against opportunism. Hence, the importance of developing high levels of trust between partners in order to ensure 
effective interfirm links is evident (Dodgson, 1996), since the knowledge being exchanged may be not only tacit but 
also specific and, as such, constitute important elements of a firm’s competence and competitiveness (Simonin, 
1999). Trust counters uncertainty stemming from the assumption of opportunism and it helps reduce the complexity 
of the exchange. From a “rational prediction” point of view, agents focus on collecting and processing information to 
project likely outcomes of certain future events (Lewis and Weigert, 1985). From this perspective, agents are 
perceived to think about trust in a highly calculative and risk – oriented fashion (Barney and Hansen, 1994; 
Williamson, 1975). Hence, conditions of trust arise when parties have something at risk and trust can be seen as 
cooperation in a prisoner’s dilemma game (Lewis and Weigert, 1985). There seems to be evidence of general 
agreement across disciplines (e.g. psychology, sociology and economics) that risk is essential in conceptualizing 
trust (Rousseau et al., 1998). Trust and the perception of opportunistic behaviour have been linked in several studies. 
Quite a few researchers have shown that the risk of the partner behaving opportunistically is lessened in the presence 
of trust (Bradach and Eccles, 1989; Hill, 1990).  
Despite widespread scholarly and managerial interest in interfirm trust and opportunism, there is lack of clarity in 
the relationship between these two constructs (Barney and Hansen, 1994; Lewicki et al., 1998). Katsikeas et al. 
(2009) study reveals that opportunism has the strongest effect on trust. Their study reveals that internal uncertainty 
influences trust but not opportunism, whereas external uncertainty affects opportunism but not trust. One possible 
explanation for this counterintuitive evidence lies in the role that trust plays in reducing perceived risk (Chiles and 
McMackin, 1996). When one cannot predict the actions of another, one has less certainty about the other’s 
behaviour. Difficulty in assessing the partner’s tasks disheartens the development of trust. Partners whose behaviour 
is foreseeable are trusted more than those who behave in an uncertain manner. That one’s behaviour cannot be 
anticipated does not necessarily mean that one acts with guile. Scepticism of harbouring exploitative intentions – that 
impede trust – may appear, but still this does not constitute opportunistic action. Katsikeas et al. (2009) suggest that 
an interesting line of theoretical exploration could involve examining a complete set of drivers and outcomes of 
these competing behavioural assumptions and drawing a clear distinction between trust and opportunism. As Wathne 
and Heide (2000) note, though much of the recent literature on interfirm exchange has documented the role of 
opportunism, the complexity of the phenomenon has not been fully explored and there is a need for more research on 
this issue.  
The two concepts, opportunistic behaviour and trust, are related by considering the risk dimension of trust. In 
fact, according to Inkpen and Currall (1998), risk has to be present for trust to operate, an idea that Nooteboom 
(2002) also subscribes to and that is common to several theorists on trust that elect risk as one dimension of the 
construct (Michalos, 1990; Kramer, 1999). Costa e Silva et al. (2012) believe that the opportunism one partner 
perceives in its counterpart can help determine the degree of trust demonstrated in that partner and, though the 
absence of opportunism does not necessarily lead to trust, its presence will decrease it. So, to build trust, more than 
just the absence of perceived opportunism is necessary. Trust goes beyond that. But, when the perception of 
opportunistic behaviour is high, a low degree of trust should be expected. When a perception of trust is being 
formed, a partner needs to have an idea about the possible opportunistic behaviour of its counterpart. Morgan and 
Hunt (1994) refer to “a negative influence in trust formation”. When a party believes that a partner engages in 
opportunistic behaviour, such perception will lead to a decrease in trust. Moreover, when the parties involved in a 
business–to–business relationship trust each other, they are less likely to show opportunistic behaviour (Leonidou et 
al., 2006) or take advantage of each other (Bloemer et al., 2013). 
Smith and Barclay (1997) found that forbearance from opportunistic behaviour indicates trusting behaviour. This 
results from the opportunistic risk that a company perceives in its relationship. It is imperative to consider as very 
important the positive responses to promises made, as well as acting with honesty, integrity and forbearance from 
opportunistic behaviour. A regular evaluation of the risks involved in the partnership should also be considered 
important in the trust building process (Costa e Silva et al., 2012). The path – dependent connection between trust 
and risk – taking arises from a reciprocal relationship, where risk creates an opportunity for trust, which in turn (if 
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the desired behaviour materializes) leads to more risk taking. This is the reason why one can argue that there is a 
fundamental contradiction: the more you trust, the more vulnerable you are and more you are exposed to the risk of 
opportunism. Thus, results the question: more trust leads to more opportunism? We argue that although risk – taking 
breeds trust, firms do not blindly take unjustified risks in the hope of developing a trustful relationship. Evidence 
suggests that firms adopt an incremental approach, in which the initial investment is small (Larson, 1992). To sum 
up, when negotiating structural and contractual elements repeatedly with a partner during the evolution of an ISA, 
the risk of opportunistic behaviour from the other partner will be evaluated and re–evaluated and one would expect 
the following relationship between perceived risk of opportunism and trust:  
 
Proposition 3: Perceived risk of opportunism will have a negative impact on the development of trust among ISA 
partners 
 
3. Conclusions and objectives for further research 
The aim of this paper is to revisit the concept of trust in the context of ISAs and to present a number of 
propositions on the contextual factors that have an impact on the development of trust at the later stages of alliance 
operations. The paradox that the failure rates of alliances remains very high, despite the increasing firm interest for 
ISA participation, is illustrated in the first section. In addition, the gap (both academic and managerial) on the 
various aspects of interfirm collaborations is highlighted. The main section contains the analysis of our theoretical 
framework and refers to the post alliance – formation factors, which are the variables that affect trust expansion as 
an ISA operates through time. Three propositions are presented and discussed. We conclude that alliance age as well 
as built–up interdependence of the partner firms positively affects trust in the context of ISAs. On the other hand, we 
propose that the perceived risk of opportunism has a negative impact on trust expansion in ISAs.  
As far as further research is concerned, we aim at examining the proposed conceptual framework using a mixed 
methodology (interviews/case studies and questionnaire survey). Senior executives of Greek firms with ISA 
participation will be interviewed and their views on the subject will be analyzed. In addition, an appropriate 
questionnaire will be developed and sent to managers of Greek companies that have formed ISAs in recent years and 
the results will be statistically analyzed. We strongly believe that any possible findings would constitute a valuable 
addition in the international literature about the complex concept of trust among alliance partners. 
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